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Civil Right to Counsel: In re Marriage of King  
and the Continuing Journey 
Deborah Perluss1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In December 2007, the Washington Supreme Court decided the case of In 
re Marriage of King.2 The case held that the state does not need to provide 
an indigent parent with counsel at public expense in judicial proceedings 
that threaten her parent-child relationship—more specifically, an attorney 
need not represent a mother before a court can remove her as the primary 
caregiver of her three children. The Washington Supreme Court arrived at 
this conclusion, even though the mother faced a grossly uneven playing 
field due to her limited education, her incapacity to present an effective 
case, and the father having the benefit of counsel. How and why the court 
arrived at this conclusion is worth some examination, both to gain insight 
into the contextual aspects of judicial decision-making and to inform 
strategies for enforcing constitutional rights in general and, in particular, the 
right to counsel in noncriminal cases. 
This article examines the King decision in light of the substantiated need 
for indigent representation, the right to counsel jurisprudence in 
noncriminal cases in Washington, and with reference to the national 
movement in support of defined rights to counsel in certain compelling civil 
cases. The article also discusses recent research of the effects on individuals 
and courts when litigants are unrepresented, and it identifies circumstances 
in which judicially-established rights to counsel may still be achieved in 
Washington following King. Finally, this article examines the King decision 
in order to arrive at some understanding of how a supreme court, which is 
viewed as a leader in the cause of equal justice, could fail to be persuaded 
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by the contextual injustice that occurred in this case—one that is not an 
isolated occurrence in Washington courts. 
First, I will briefly define the problem that is discussed in this article by 
referring to the overwhelming need for legal aid in Washington and some 
recent efforts in response to the problem. Then, I will briefly discuss the 
history and status of when Washington requires the provision of counsel for 
individuals in noncriminal cases. This is followed by a description of what 
happens to unrepresented individuals in courts to demonstrate that the 
issues being discussed have real day-to-day impacts for both litigants and 
the courts. This, hopefully, sets the stage for a discussion of the issues and 
the decision in King, followed by a discussion of recent research on 
whether, as a practical matter, lawyer representation has an impact on the 
outcome of a noncriminal case. Finally, I will discuss post-King 
developments and continuing efforts in Washington and nationally to 
advance access to justice for all persons through advocacy that promotes the 
right to counsel in cases that impact basic human needs and significantly 
affect the daily lives of individuals. 
While this article necessarily discusses these issues with citation to cases, 
data, and other resources; the subjective arguments and speculative 
assertions are derived from insights, perceptions, and impressions gained 
from a thirty-year career as a civil legal aid attorney in Washington. Over 
the course of my career, I have witnessed or known of innumerable 
unrepresented individuals who have experienced unfair results in courts 
solely because a lawyer was not present to help tell their story coherently, 
bring out the relevant facts of their case, make a persuasive presentation, 
and/or inform the judge of applicable law.3 
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM AND COMPELLING A RESPONSE 
The need for help with noncriminal legal problems in Washington is high 
and mirrors the need nationally.4 Certainly, legal aid programs cannot 
represent all low-income persons needing a lawyer in civil litigation.5 
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Indeed, every year thousands of individuals appear in Washington courts 
without a lawyer.6 The consequences for low-income persons (who are 
forced to confront legal problems that are legislatively consigned to the 
courts for resolution) are even more pronounced because their legal issues 
often involve basic human needs such as housing, sustenance, and 
protection from family violence.7 In many cases, one party is represented by 
a lawyer, while the other is not.8 In a high percentage of these cases, the 
unrepresented party loses on meritorious causes or forfeits rights that are 
before the court.9 In addition, unrepresented litigants often fail to exercise 
procedural rights that would benefit their cause or give them a strategic 
advantage, if they only knew about the procedural right or how to raise it.10 
As a result, a significant number of decisions are rendered each year by 
judges without full knowledge of the facts or consideration of the law that 
applies to a particular case.11 The resulting outcomes are sometimes merely 
erroneous, but often they are life-changing and, occasionally, even tragic. 
In response to this problem, the American Bar Association (ABA) 
spearheaded a national movement12 to consider whether, in certain 
noncriminal cases, the issues for litigants are so fundamental or critical to 
their lives and well-being that governments ought to be providing those 
litigants with lawyers as a matter of right when faced with adversarial 
judicial proceedings. In 2006, the ABA’s policy-making House of 
Delegates unanimously approved Report and Recommendation No. 112A, 
adopting the Report as official ABA policy for the right to counsel in non-
criminal proceedings.13 The policy statement urges “federal, state, and 
territorial governments to provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public 
expense to low-income persons in those categories of proceedings where 
basic human needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, 
safety, health, or child custody, as determined by each jurisdiction.”14 
Following the adoption of this brief policy statement, an ABA Presidential 
Task Force developed a statement of principles expanding on the 
concepts.15 The principles are accompanied by a proposed Model Act to 
16 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
CIVIL LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
assist jurisdictions with implementing the civil right to counsel with a 
workable structure.16 Both of these initiatives were adopted as official ABA 
policy at the August 2010 meeting of the House of Delegates.17 
III. CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN WASHINGTON 
In Washington State, the equal justice community has long focused on 
efforts to expand the right to counsel in civil proceedings. Early cases 
established a right to counsel for parents in a few specific circumstances, 
such as juvenile court proceedings where the state sought to impair or 
terminate parental rights,18 when a private civil contempt proceeding could 
result in the imprisonment of a party,19 and when the competency of a 
lawyer is at issue in disciplinary proceedings that could impair their ability 
to practice law.20 More recently, courts have held that counsel must be 
provided to a child in truancy hearings21 and to protect parental rights in a 
nonparental custody proceeding that flows from a permanency plan process 
for a child who is a dependent ward of the juvenile court.22 
Washington also affords a civil right to counsel by statute in limited 
circumstances.23 Washington provides a discretionary right to counsel for 
petitioners who seek a sexual assault protection order if the respondent 
appears with counsel,24 as well as for a child over the age of twelve in a 
dependency proceeding.25 In 2007, the Washington Supreme Court also 
adopted a general court rule, GR 33, which affords the opportunity for 
indigent persons with disabilities to seek appointment of counsel when 
needed, as a reasonable accommodation to ensure meaningful access to the 
justice system.26 
Despite the expansion of the above-established rights to counsel in civil 
proceedings, Washington courts have still not extended rights to counsel 
when judicial proceedings have threatened a party’s basic needs. These 
include proceedings to evict one from rental housing,27 to obtain economic 
governmental benefits,28 and most recently, to protect parental rights in a 
private custody/parenting plan proceeding as between two parents.29 
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As discussed below, there are cases currently pending in the Washington 
courts that will address the right to counsel in other civil contexts post-King. 
In addition to Bellevue School Dist. v. E.S.30—which involves the right to 
counsel for children in truancy fact-finding proceedings—another case, In 
re A.R./D.R., will address a child’s right to counsel in a parental rights 
termination proceeding in juvenile court.31 In both of these cases, the trial 
courts had not provided counsel to children, resulting in their loss of rights 
to education and familial relations. 
In all of these cases, as in King, the unrepresented parties faced a 
significant imbalance of power in the judicial process, with either the 
superior power of the state, school district, or an otherwise represented 
opposing party proceeding against them. The imbalance of power is not and 
cannot be cured by judges who struggle in such cases to accommodate the 
unskilled litigants and are often frustrated by their inability to proceed 
according to the formal rules and expectations of the adversarial process.32 
Regardless of this frustration, how could a supreme court, which is 
viewed as a national leader in the cause of equal justice, fail to be persuaded 
by the contextual injustice that occurred in the King case—one that is not an 
isolated occurrence in Washington courts? A careful reading of King’s 
majority decision leaves one to infer that the judiciary is institutionally 
constrained to grant remedies that challenge the basic assumption that all 
litigants get justice in court, even though the structure of the judicial system 
itself is a barrier to justice. 
IV. JUDICIAL INADEQUACIES FACING UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS 
Following the adoption of the ABA policy resolution in 2006, the 
Washington Supreme Court was the first state high court to have the 
opportunity to take up the ABA’s call in the case of In re Marriage of 
King.33 Brenda King, an indigent mother of three with limited education and 
few resources, was the unrepresented parent and appellant who asked the 
court to provide her a lawyer to help her protect her interest in remaining 
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the primary residential parent of her three young children.34 Because Brenda 
King could not get an attorney to represent her in her fight to keep primary 
residential care of her children, which culminated in a five-day trial, she 
was forced to advocate on her own behalf.35 During the trial, Brenda King 
struggled to present and challenge evidence and to examine witnesses, 
including herself, her estranged husband, and a hostile guardian ad litem 
(GAL) for the children. Additionally, she found it difficult to make coherent 
legal arguments while trying to maintain a level of physical and emotional 
stamina needed to address the most basic and personal aspects of her life. In 
contrast, her husband had a lawyer representing him throughout the 
proceedings. 
Needless to say, Brenda King lost her battle, leaving her to lament in the 
final hours of the case, “I am a good mother, I am a lousy lawyer!”36 The 
observation is all the more prescient given the postdecision events in the 
case. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s 
decision to grant primary residential care of the children to Mr. King. 
Subsequently, Brenda King returned to court, this time with a lawyer who 
agreed to take her case on a pro bono basis, and petitioned to modify the 
parenting plan so as to return primary custody of the children to her.37 In 
July 2008, a Final Parenting Plan was entered that returned the children to 
her primary residential care.38 
Indeed, when the trial judge denied Brenda King’s request for a new trial 
and appointment of counsel, he acknowledged that “[Mrs. King] was at a 
significant disadvantage through her inability to retain counsel to represent 
her at trial and her inability to secure pro bono representation, despite her 
requests for such representation, which circumstances mirror the access to 
justice crisis throughout the State.”39 The trial judge further observed: 
[C]andidly I agree . . . insofar as . . . Mrs. King not being well 
served because she was pro se. I think the record will bear that out. 
That she had a very difficult time at trial, that there were objections 
that she was unfamiliar with, [and that she] did not respond. 
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Evidence that she apparently had consisting, I think, in some cases, 
of police reports that didn’t see the light of day because there were 
proper objections based on hearsay. And she didn’t know enough 
about the rules to secure the presence of a witness to testify to what 
facts she thought might have been relevant. And I think in the 
materials that you submitted, you’ve also pointed out from the 
daycare or the school, rather, some information that did come in to 
evidence because it appears there was no objection. And some of 
that information was hearsay and may have been inaccurate, which 
is why we have hearsay objections, which Mrs. King did not raise 
at trial or I would have sustained an objection and kept some of 
that evidence out.40 
In a passionate and compelling dissent to King’s majority opinion, Justice 
(now Chief Justice) Madsen said that she viewed this demonstration of 
judicial inadequacy as the basis for why counsel should be provided as of 
right in such cases.41 As she so eloquently stated, “Ms. King’s struggle to 
represent herself in this case demonstrates the legal hurdles that arise every 
day in courtrooms across Washington, showing the importance of counsel 
to a parent in a dissolution proceeding seeking to secure her fundamental 
right to parent her children.”42 
One need only refer to Justice Madsen’s dissenting opinion to get a flavor 
of the disadvantaged environment in which Brenda King found herself, and 
as a result, the skewed lens through which the trial judge ultimately viewed 
the case. The facts are recounted in detail and need not be repeated here.43 It 
is sufficient to quote Justice Madsen’s indisputable conclusion: 
As the facts show, Ms. King lacked even a high school education, 
much less the education and training necessary to be a lawyer. She 
was unable to present her case effectively because she could not 
master the rules of evidence and she was unable to prevent 
admission of evidence that a lawyer would have been able to keep 
out. Ms. King was unable to match the skill of opposing counsel. 
Her emotions adversely affected her performance, and the record 
makes it clear that by the end of trial she had exhausted the court’s 
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patience. The trial judge frankly acknowledged that Ms. King’s 
self-representation had been inadequate.44 
Thus, the question to address is: why against the facts and circumstances 
present in the King case, when it was clear that the Brenda King was 
significantly disadvantaged by the absence of a lawyer (even to the point 
that the trial judge himself acknowledged the adverse impact on his decision 
making), did a majority of the Washington Supreme Court not see fit to find 
any legal basis upon which Brenda King should have been provided counsel 
as a matter of right? An increasing body of research substantiates that the 
absence of representation for civil litigants in adversarial proceedings 
negatively impacts the judge’s decision-making, the outcome, and calls into 
question the basic fairness and integrity of the judicial process.45 A ruling 
that indigent persons in civil proceedings have a right to representation by 
competent counsel could be viewed as implicitly challenging the court 
system’s image as a “just” process. Such a ruling would test the validity of 
judges as neutral fact-finders and purveyors of justice without regard to the 
status of the parties coming before them. It would also require some self-
reflection and acknowledgement of the potential for bias within the judicial 
system, which may have been unpalatable for a court recognized as a leader 
on equal access to justice. 
V. THE ISSUES ON APPEAL IN KING 
Importantly, Brenda King pursued her request for appointed counsel even 
after having lost primary custody in a five-day trial, demonstrating a record 
replete with examples of her ineffectiveness, yet with no apparent legal 
error that she could easily point to in the court’s decision on the merits. 
Thus, the only issue presented to the court for consideration on appeal was 
whether, in the context of a highly adversarial, high-stakes custody dispute 
in which one parent is represented by counsel and the other is not, does she, 
the unrepresented parent, have a constitutional right to appointed counsel.46 
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Certainly, Brenda King was well-represented in the appeal by highly 
competent pro bono counsel, and the cause was supported by respected 
amicus curiae.47 One can speculate that the potential cost of counsel was the 
sole concern that influenced the court. However, because the U.S. Supreme 
Court has frequently ruled that cost alone cannot be a factor in considering 
what process is due under the Fourteenth Amendment,48 and the 
Washington Supreme Court has not shied away from rendering decisions 
that result in significant additional cost to the state budget,49 one cannot 
assume that cost alone was the impetus for the court’s decision. 
Nevertheless, cost was a focus of the briefs submitted by amicus curiae 
against Brenda King’s claim for counsel, which effectively made it an issue 
for the court.50 Without directly arguing the cost point, both the amici 
attorney general and the legislature characterized the right sought as 
“taxpayer-paid counsel in a civil case.”51 The Association of Counties more 
accurately defined the right sought as not merely access to the courts, but as 
the right to “litigate effectively once in court,”52 and directly cited the 
limited budget available to fund competing human needs in support of its 
argument to deny the right.53 However, other amici, in particular the Retired 
Washington Judges, focused their brief on the costs to the judicial system 
and to society at large of failing to provide counsel for unrepresented 
litigants in adversarial proceedings. Such costs include the time-consuming 
nature of dealing with unskilled litigants, the inefficiencies involved in 
multiple exchanges regarding sufficiency of evidence, lack of compliance 
with evidentiary rules and process, delayed proceedings due to improper 
paper work, costs to the integrity of the decision making process, and an 
impaired trust and confidence in the courts.54 Although the judicial system 
is greatly affected by such inefficiencies, indigent individuals bear the 
ultimate costs resulting from wrong or inappropriate decisions flowing from 
the lack of adequate information. 
In contrast to the above characterizations of the issue before the court, 
Brenda King defined the right she sought as “meaningful access to the 
22 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
CIVIL LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
court.”55 Supportive amici variously characterized the right at issue as a 
right to appointment of counsel when: 
 a litigant is “facing the loss of basic human needs”56 (focusing on 
the relevant need or interest as critical); 
 the “absence of representation” for the particular litigant leaves the 
proceedings “constitutionally deficient”57 (suggesting that a case-
by-case determination should occur with respect to the abilities of 
the particular litigant and the complexity of the proceeding); or 
 the right to a “fair trial” cannot be met otherwise58 (advocating a 
broad general right to counsel in civil litigation as a matter of 
fairness). 
Hence, while the issues were joined, the court had a number of options it 
could have chosen for how to analyze the right and could have found a 
broad right or, more realistically, limited its scope in any number of ways to 
the specific facts of the King case (such as disputed custody, the primary 
parent’s lack of representation, and the other parent’s representation) or to 
the category of disputed child custody cases, as determined on a case-by-
case basis. 
The court had a recent history of not only understanding the cause of 
access to the civil justice system but also a commitment to it,59 and there 
was hope that the court would be sympathetic. In a recent decision, the 
Washington Supreme Court justices had commented on the potential need 
for courts to appoint lawyers for children in private custody disputes.60 The 
confluence of circumstances suggested that, if ever there was a time and 
case to further expand the civil right to counsel beyond the narrow scope of 
state-initiated deprivation of parental rights (Myricks61/Luscier62) and 
physical incarceration cases (Tetro63), this was the time, and King was the 
case. 
As it turned out, external events occurred that could not have been 
anticipated when Brenda King filed her appeal in early 2006. The case was 
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argued in May 2007 and the court issued its decision on December 6, 2007, 
just before the beginning of the 2008 legislative session. During the earlier 
2007 session, the legislature had responded to the justice crisis and the need 
for increased funding (as championed by the court in their “Justice in 
Jeopardy” initiative) by approving a significant increase in state funding for 
civil legal aid over the 2007–2009 biennium.64 How much this played into 
the justices’ reasoning is unknown. Even so, the additional state funds that 
the legislature had made available earlier in the year would not be enough to 
address the need for representation in disputed custody cases. 
Neither would the funding have turned back the clock for Brenda King. 
The ultimate decision in the case was 7–2 against any expansion of the right 
to counsel,65 with only Justices Madsen and Chambers dissenting.66 
VI. THE MAJORITY DECISION IN KING  
As discussed above, the court had a number of options available to grant 
Brenda King a new trial with appointed counsel without having to grant a 
broad right to counsel and otherwise threaten the status quo. Instead, the 
court chose a direct and calculated path that was more expansive than 
necessary to deny her the opportunity for a new custody trial with appointed 
counsel. In doing so, the court seemed to send a deliberate message 
cautioning against new cases that sought further expansion of a civil right to 
counsel. Nevertheless, as new cases continue to present this need in other 
compelling circumstances, close analysis of the King decision may help the 
cause of others who seek to advance the right. 
The Washington Supreme Court’s antipathy toward Brenda King and her 
cause is suggested by the conclusion reached, the language used, and the 
unnecessarily broad scope of analysis. First, in contrast to the dissent’s 
focus on the parental rights issues at stake, the majority characterized the 
case strictly as a “dissolution”—a proceeding that historically carries a 
negative connotation.67 Thus, from the outset, the majority framed the 
question as follows: “This case involves the issue of whether an indigent 
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parent has a constitutional right, primarily under the Washington State 
Constitution, to appointment of counsel at public expense in a dissolution 
proceeding.”68 As such, the frame is less about the constitutionally-
protected, parent-child relationship and more about the re-ordering of an 
estranged relationship, which is entitled to somewhat lesser protection 
under Washington law.69 The majority described the impact of the trial 
court’s ruling in terms that minimized the consequences for Brenda King 
and her parent-child interests: “At the trial’s conclusion, the superior court 
entered a parenting plan granting primary residential care of the children to 
the father-respondent. The plan granted visitation rights to the petitioner-
mother.”70 
Second, in contrast to the dissenting opinion’s exhaustive recitation of the 
facts, the majority devoted one short paragraph to the facts: the parties were 
married (without any elaboration), Brenda King was the primary caregiver 
of the children, the parties separated, and Mr. King sought to become the 
primary residential parent.71 This was followed by a minimal statement of 
what occurred at trial, essentially stating that Mr. King was represented at 
trial, Brenda King was not, and the court ruled in his favor.72 Needless to 
say, the majority did not address the contextual circumstances surrounding 
Brenda King’s incapacity to present her case or the impact of her lack of 
representation on the fairness of the process itself. 
Instead, the majority rested on the “nature of the interest implicated” as 
the guide to its constitutional analysis.73 How it defined the interest would 
prove to be decisive. If an interest is defined as fundamental under existing 
law, it is entitled to “constitutional significance” and the full panoply of due 
process attaches, including appointed counsel at public expense.74 In this 
case, even though the parent-child bond between Brenda King and her three 
minor children was directly at stake and subject to an involuntary 
interference by the state court, the majority framed the interest at stake and 
the adversarial process involved as “effectuating a legislative purpose of 
continued involvement in the children’s lives.”75 In other words, as 
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portrayed, the state had done Brenda King a favor in providing her a means 
and process through which to maintain a relationship with her children, so 
why was she complaining?76 Thus, the majority deemed the issue to be 
“fundamentally different” from the termination or impairment of parental 
rights that occurs in state-initiated dependency proceedings.77 Hence, the 
majority concluded that the “interest at stake” was not of sufficient 
constitutional magnitude to warrant a right to counsel under existing 
Myricks/Luscier case precedents.78 
The majority supported its conclusion by asserting that Washington’s 
parenting plan statutes provide numerous safeguards to protect parents from 
“erroneous decisions.”79 In making this observation, the majority made no 
reference whatsoever to the record of the case, which, as acknowledged by 
the trial judge, was replete with opportunities for erroneous decision 
making.80 Moreover, in most circumstances, these “safeguards” are illusory 
for indigent, parenting plan litigants who lack the means to pay for the 
resources authorized. Furthermore, as noted by the dissent and reflected in 
the amicus curiae brief from Northwest Women’s Law Center (now Legal 
Voice), the statutory “protection” for provision of a GAL contributes to the 
complexity of the process for unrepresented litigants, who may not 
understand the importance a GAL.81 Indeed, in this case, Brenda King had 
to contend with a hostile GAL who recommended that the trial court place 
the children with Mr. King.82 The other statutory “protections” cited by the 
majority were either not utilized by the trial court or not available to Brenda 
King, perhaps because she was not aware of them, did not know how to 
access them, or did not have the funds to pay for them. 
The majority could have ended its discussion at the point of finding that 
due process protections under state and federal constitutional law do not 
afford a private indigent litigant in a divorce case a right to counsel. 
However, somewhat mixing the analysis of the constitutional claims related 
to the parent-child relationship (which the majority said “are not implicated 
in a dissolution proceeding”83) and Brenda King’s claim based on other 
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state constitutional grounds, the court proceeded to analyze the other bases 
for the claim, finding the interests “significant enough.”84 
First, the majority analyzed and struck down Brenda King’s “meaningful 
access to justice” claim. In addition to the due process protections of the 
federal and state constitutions, Ms. King argued that appointment of an 
attorney to represent her in the disputed custody proceeding was necessary 
to enable her to have meaningful access to justice, a right guaranteed by 
article I, section 10 of the Washington State Constitution.85 Even though 
Washington law has long held that access to courts is a fundamental right 
and courts have the inherent power to protect this right,86 the King majority 
would limit courts’ inherent power to overcoming tangible barriers (e.g., 
physical facilities and court fees). In doing so, however, the court 
unnecessarily took the opportunity to define the concept of “access to 
courts” as merely a term of art that holds no “linguistic” meaning apart from 
literal egress to the courthouse and through the threshold of the courtroom 
door.87 
Next, the majority went on to examine Brenda King’s claim for 
appointed counsel under the Washington State Constitution’s due process 
and privileges and immunities provisions.88 In applying the Washington 
Supreme Court’s six-prong analytical framework set out in State v. 
Gunwall89 (determining when a state constitutional provision is applied 
more protectively than the comparable provision in the U.S. Constitution), 
the King court could have justifiably found that the state constitution 
afforded greater protection than the federal constitution for a civil litigant’s 
appointment of counsel. The court did determine that, regarding the 
structure of the state constitution, the primacy of family law as a state 
interest, and the state history of providing counsel in dependency and 
parental rights termination cases, the Washington State Constitution’s 
article I, section 3 is more protective than Fourteenth Amendment due 
process.90 
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Nevertheless, the court refused to engage in the independent state 
constitutional analysis. The rationale for not doing so was twofold: (1) no 
other court has found a due process right to counsel in a custody context 
and (2) no fundamental rights of Brenda King were at stake.91 Having 
already dismissed the idea that parental rights in a private custody dispute 
are fundamental, and having concluded “access to courts” does not 
encompass overcoming intangible barriers posed by court structure and 
process, the majority reiterated that a right to appointed counsel in child 
custody proceedings did not arise under article I, section 3 of the 
Washington State Constitution.92 
It is hard to read much into the court’s apparent concern that it would be 
an “outlier” among the states by providing counsel to indigent child custody 
litigants at public expense. In fact, in 1979, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled 
that when one parent is provided free representation in a custody proceeding 
and the other parent is indigent and unrepresented, counsel must be 
appointed at public expense.93 The Washington Supreme Court itself was an 
early adopter of a parent’s right to counsel in termination and dependency 
proceedings.94 The ABA policy statements on point and the Washington 
State Bar Association’s amicus brief in King hardly suggest that the notion 
lies in radical legal thinking. 
The final basis rejected by the court for providing Brenda King with a 
right to counsel was the privileges and immunities provision in article I, 
section 12 of the Washington Constitution.95 Ms. King had argued that use 
of the courts to resolve disputes is a privilege afforded by the state,96 
although not equally available to persons without resources to hire an 
attorney.97 The majority dispensed with the claim simply by characterizing 
the case as involving a “purely private matter initiated by the parties,”98 
without discussing the import of disparities in outcomes or the varying 
quality of justice received as between the represented and the 
unrepresented.99 
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VII. DOES A LAWYER MATTER? 
Although the majority failed to address the impact of having a lawyer on 
the quality of justice received, the dissent did not shy away from this issue. 
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Madsen pointed to empirical studies that 
demonstrate the differences in outcomes when litigants are represented and 
when they are not. One study of custody proceedings found that attorney-
represented mothers were twice as likely as pro se mothers to be awarded 
full or joint custody when the opposing fathers were represented by 
counsel.100 Another study, which focused on the early days following the 
adoption of Washington’s Parenting Act,101 found that shared parenting 
plans in King County were as much as 42 percent more likely to occur 
where both parties were represented by counsel than in cases where one 
party appeared pro se.102 
In addition to the studies cited by Justice Madsen’s dissent, more recent 
studies substantiate the earlier conclusions.103 For example, Stanford 
researcher Rebecca Sandefur conducted a meta-analysis of several studies 
across various disciplines and found that litigants who were represented by 
lawyers were between 17 percent and 1,380 percent more likely to win, 
with the largest differences in the outcomes between lawyer-represented 
and unrepresented cases at every level of litigation.104 Sandefur reports that 
unrepresented litigants “are often observed to make elementary errors, such 
as failing to make an argument, to address the other side’s arguments, or to 
bring to trial important pieces of evidence.”105 As further confirmation of 
this observation, the ABA recently released a preliminary report on a survey 
of nearly one thousand judges regarding their experiences with 
unrepresented litigants. Sixty-two percent of all judges surveyed said the 
outcomes are worse for litigants when they represent themselves.  Those 
judges cited the most common problem for litigants included, a failure to 
present necessary evidence, procedural errors, ineffective witness 
examination, and failure to properly object to evidence.106 
In re Marriage of King and the Continuing Journey 29 
VOLUME 9 • ISSUE 1 • 2010 
In theorizing why the presence of a lawyer matters, in addition to the 
formal knowledge of law and the procedural rules of litigation, Sandefur 
proposes that the act of lawyering itself helps the client translate their 
problem into a solution through a process of diagnosis, inference, and 
treatment.107 For example, in a child custody dispute, there is a need to 
separate the emotional response from the legal concepts and to 
constructively respond using the professional tools available with 
intellectual detachment. Sandefur calls this “the ability to distance oneself 
from the human mess of people’s problems and to identify the stakes, risks, 
and benefits of alternative courses of action.”108 Certainly, the inability of 
Brenda King to distance herself from the potential impacts and the risk of 
loss to her and her children, as well as her inability to conform to procedural 
and evidentiary rules, both contributed to her inability to effectively 
advocate for her own interests. 
Another theory is more subjective. Sandefur reports that the studies 
examining outcome disparities in cases between litigants with 
representation and those without indicate that the mere presence of an 
attorney representing a client can affect the judge’s perception of the merits 
of the case and, thus, can predict the outcome.109 While certainly not 
conclusive and in no way covering the field of potential research of the 
issues, these studies, nevertheless, present another possible dilemma for 
litigants who lack representation. The largest differences in outcomes occur 
in cases impacting basic needs and fundamental rights, including landlord-
tenant cases, asylum cases, and social security disability hearings.110 
Sandefur speculates that the disparity is greatest in these and other types of 
disputes that particularly involve concerns impacting low-income persons 
because these litigants frequently experience double or even triple stigmas, 
such as poverty, disability, limited education, limited English language 
proficiency, or immigrant status.111 Thus, lawyer representation in cases 
involving “lower status parties” may act as an endorsement of the client and 
the client’s cause, which affects how judges and other court staff treat the 
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client and evaluate the client’s claims. That is, judges and court staff believe 
that the lawyer-represented cases are more likely to be meritorious and, 
therefore, view the facts in this light, regardless of how they are 
presented.112 Whether this “belief” was also an unconscious factor in the 
King decision must be left to conjecture.113 
VIII. RIGHT TO COUNSEL DEVELOPMENTS POST-KING 
So where does the King decision leave those who seek equal justice for 
all? What does it mean for those who believe that a core principle of the 
fundamental right of access to courts is the right to have a lawyer advocate 
for one’s interests when basic human needs or fundamental rights are at 
stake? Given the breadth of the court’s decision in King and the short shrift 
given to a contextual basis for considering appointment of counsel, it is 
unlikely that the Washington Supreme Court will soon revisit the issue in 
any case involving a “purely private matter initiated by the parties.” 
However, pursuing the right in other contexts is not foreclosed—
particularly those contexts in which matters of public interest are involved, 
or in which a governmental actor either initiates the action or is inextricably 
entwined in the proceedings. 
As discussed above, two cases are currently pending before the 
Washington Supreme Court on whether children are entitled to be 
represented by counsel: first, in truancy proceedings brought by a school 
district;114 and second, in proceedings brought by the state to terminate 
parental rights.115 These cases may provide the opportunity for the court to 
carve out children as a special category for protection, given their minority, 
their lack of voice in processes that impact them directly, and the long-term 
implication for matters that affect fundamental rights, such as education, 
physical liberty, and familial relationship. Moreover, in each case, the 
power of the state is brought to bear on the child or interest at issue. In the 
truancy petition, the legal action is taken against the child as the named 
respondent who, after being hailed into court, is interrogated by the judge 
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presiding over the case without being given any adult assistance. The 
subsequent court order also operates directly against the child. If the court 
enters an order compelling the child to attend school and the child fails to 
comply with the order, the child could be held in contempt of court and 
incarcerated for up to seven days.116 Thus, any violation of the order risks 
deprivation of the child’s physical liberty. 
Whether the court sees fit to find that a child is entitled to representation 
in truancy cases may very well depend on whether the presence of a lawyer 
matters. Representation by a lawyer for a child in truancy proceedings could 
have a direct and beneficial impact on the outcome for the child. Efforts to 
determine the reason why the child is not attending school and to provide 
services to address the concern are both statutory preconditions to a child 
being found “truant” by the court. Typically in truancy cases, the fact-
finding hearing lasts just a few minutes, and more frequently, the hearings 
are not held at all. This is because the child is often pressured into agreeing 
to enter a court order finding them truant and compelling the child’s school 
attendance.117 Anecdotal evidence suggests that in virtually every case in 
which an unrepresented student is brought before the court, the student is 
found “truant” and subject to an order to attend school.118 
The case of In re Dependency of A.R. and D.R.119 asks the court to 
consider whether children are entitled to counsel in a different context—
when their interest in the parent-child relationship is at stake in parental 
rights termination proceedings. This context varies from the truancy 
proceeding in several respects. For example, though the action is initiated 
by the state, it is not brought directly against the child. Rather, the state 
arguably pursues the action “in the best interests of the child.”120 The 
child’s interests are represented by an independent advocate, a guardian ad 
litem (GAL), who may or may not be an attorney. However, because the 
GAL is not obligated to take direction from the child at issue, the presence 
of a GAL does not necessarily give a “voice” to the child in court.121 
Finally, how a lawyer can affect the outcome of the parental rights 
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termination process may be less clear in the termination context than in the 
truancy case. In a termination proceeding, the state has the burden of 
establishing that specific statutory criteria have been met;122 once it has 
done so, the court is authorized to terminate the parental rights. There is 
little flexibility in the criteria, and the desires of the child are not a statutory 
factor. Moreover, the child often has little knowledge or information to 
bring to bear on the statutory criteria. Nevertheless, the child’s “best 
interest” or desire can influence how the court interprets the other criteria 
and, ultimately, the outcome. 
Indeed, there are strong reasons related to the child’s emotional, 
psychological, or physical health that could influence the process and result 
in a conclusion that, even though the statutory facts have been met and the 
parents are not able to resume care of the child, the parent-child bond 
should not be severed.123 In the absence of a lawyer for the child, however, 
the court relies on the state and the GAL to inform the court of these 
concerns, and consequently, the child’s “voice” may never be heard.124 
Given the fundamental nature of the interest at stake and the precedent of 
the Myricks/Luscier cases, in which Washington first adopted a right to 
counsel for parents in juvenile court termination and dependency 
proceedings, there is strong basis for the court to extend the right to children 
as well.125 
How the court resolves the question of counsel in each of these cases 
currently remains to be seen. The court could potentially recognize a right 
to counsel in both cases, in neither case, or in one case and not the other, 
and in doing so, may cite any number of differences in the proceedings. 
These include the differing interests at stake, the varying complexity of the 
proceedings, the impact of a lawyer on the outcome for the child, the nature 
of the potential outcome of the case (e.g., change in a child’s placement 
versus potential incarceration), or the representation by a GAL in the 
termination proceeding versus lack of an advocate at all in the truancy 
proceeding. The court could also rule in both the termination and truancy 
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contexts that children should be entitled to representation by skilled 
counsel, separate and apart from the GAL role, in any adversarial 
proceeding in which their basic needs or fundamental rights are at stake.126 
This ruling could be based solely on their status as children, as persons in 
their own right, with their own unique and constitutionally-protected 
interests, but without the capacity or skill to represent themselves in 
court.127 
Recently decided by the Washington State Court of Appeals, Division II, 
Dependency of E.H. raised the question of an indigent parent’s right to 
counsel at public expense in an otherwise private custody proceeding when 
the state is inextricably entangled in the case and directly interested in the 
outcome.128 Dependency of E.H. involved a foster parent who sought 
custody of a child who had been a dependent ward of the juvenile court for 
five years. Each biological parent, separately and to varying degrees, made 
significant strides in recent years to address the problems that initially 
caused the state to intervene to protect the child.129 Rather than seek to 
terminate the parent-child relationship and to avoid the continuation of 
efforts to reunite the child with the parents, the state affirmatively 
encouraged the child’s foster parent to seek custody as the recommended 
permanent plan for the child’s care.130 The third-party, nonparental custody 
proceeding was filed as a separate action from the juvenile court 
dependency.131 The juvenile court then authorized the proceeding to go 
forward in the usual course through the county court’s general civil 
division.132 
The mother disputed that nonparental custody was appropriate and 
continued to ask for the child’s return to her care, but she would have been 
left to show why she should be reunited with her child without an attorney 
at her side. Under the nonparental custody statutes, there is no expressed 
right to appointed counsel for indigent parents.133 However, in the juvenile 
court dependency process, indigent parents are entitled to counsel at public 
expense for “all stages” of the dependency process.134 Thus, the appellate 
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court had to decide whether the right to counsel extends to the family court 
custody proceedings when they are initiated as an integral part of the 
juvenile court dependency case. 
The court of appeals found that the nonparental custody action was 
“inextricably linked” with the dependency issue of whether the child should 
be returned to either parent’s home.135 Therefore, the court concluded that 
because there is a statutory right to counsel at all stages of the dependency 
process, it necessarily follows that the right to counsel attaches to the 
collateral, nonparental custody proceeding initiated pursuant to the 
permanency-planning phase of the dependency process.136  
Even though the nonparental custody proceeding in Dependency of E.H. 
was brought by a private party, the King decision did not foreclose a ruling 
that the parent has a right to counsel in a custody case. Unlike in King, the 
state was directly involved in Dependency of E.H.—both as the child’s 
lawful custodian under the dependency court process and as the facilitator 
and advocate of the permanent plan. Arguably, counsel is even more critical 
for the parent in the nonparental custody proceeding because the statutory 
standards for nonparental custody are factually based, harder to meet, relate 
primarily to the fitness of the parent, and are only secondarily related to the 
best interests of the child.137 The parents’ ability to present evidence, 
examine witnesses (including experts), and to present themselves in the best 
light is absolutely critical to the outcome. When 62 percent of judges 
responding to a survey say that unrepresented parties are negatively 
impacted by lack of representation,138 the need for a lawyer to represent a 
parent in a nonparental custody case is apparent and essential to protect the 
parties and the court from an erroneous outcome—one that may have 
serious long-term consequences for the child. 
In addition to the continuing efforts to gain recognition of the right to 
counsel as opportunistic cases come before courts, several developments are 
underway nationally to explore avenues for implementing the rights in cases 
involving basic human needs or fundamental rights. As discussed above, as 
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part of the ABA’s continuing leadership on the issue, a Presidential Task 
Force worked to develop a Statement of Basic Principles of a Right to 
Counsel in Civil Proceedings139 and a Model Access Act140 to encourage 
implementation. These documents convey a sense of urgency and purpose 
among mainstream support for the equal justice cause not seen since the 
early 1960s and the aftermath of the newly-recognized right to criminal 
counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright.141 This sense of urgency and purpose is 
also propelling the development of pilot projects142 to demonstrate and 
evaluate both the beneficial impacts of counsel in civil cases and the cost 
savings that might be achieved through providing counsel to indigent 
litigants as a matter of right when basic human needs are at stake.143 
Furthermore, legislation to increase access to representation for indigents 
has been adopted in California in the Shriver Basic Access Act.144 The 
Shriver Act sets up a system that funds and delivers legal services that 
ensure some level of legal assistance for all eligible persons in certain 
categories of cases. The Act also requires representation for all indigent 
persons in adversarial judicial proceedings involving basic human needs 
and certain fundamental rights.145 
Activities expressing support for a civil right to counsel when basic 
human needs are at stake continue to garner attention in national and local 
media and among advocates. The National Coalition for a Civil Right to 
Counsel monitors the efforts and documents them through its public web-
site.146 Locally, equal justice advocates continue to identify opportunities to 
raise right to counsel issues in appropriate cases and are working through 
programs like the Symposium sponsored by the Fred T. Korematsu Center 
for Law and Equality and Washington’s three law schools.147 The advocates 
actively participate in national efforts to study case outcomes and cost 
impacts of lack of representation for indigent civil litigants, explore pilot 
project opportunities, and continue to give visibility to the issue through 
organized and coordinated efforts.148 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
There should be no question that representation by a skilled and 
competent lawyer in an adversarial proceeding of any kind beneficially 
affects the outcome for the party represented. While the research is limited, 
recent evidence suggests that the lack of representation negatively impacts 
not only an unrepresented party but also the decision making process in the 
particular case149 and the courts, in general.150 Lawyers do matter, and 
though it may be obvious, it is also borne out by research. 
Because it is increasingly apparent that lack of representation is often 
synonymous with lack of justice—despite the result in King—equal justice 
advocates will continue to pursue the right of all persons to be represented 
by competent counsel when their basic human needs and fundamental rights 
are at stake. Some will pursue the right in regard to certain constitutionally-
cognizable interests, such as familial relationships; some on behalf of 
particularly vulnerable groups, such as children, persons with disabilities, 
and victims of domestic violence; some on a case-by-case basis when there 
are particularly compelling facts; and some through legislative policy or 
other nonjudicial forums. Then there are those advocates who will continue 
to pursue the right whenever possible and through whatever vehicles are 
available, regardless of which basic human need or fundamental interest is 
at stake, or whatever classification of litigant may be at risk. The struggle 
for the right to counsel will continue because it must—it is fundamental to 
the cause of justice. 
The King decision settles the question for the moment in the context of 
Washington’s purely private custody proceedings. As disappointing as the 
decision was to the cause of equal justice, it will not stand against the test of 
time. The need is too great, the reasons are too compelling, and the 
momentum toward change is too strong to be turned back.151 Advocates for 
equal justice must continue to visualize the civil right to counsel as a core 
value and assert it when basic human needs and fundamental rights are at 
stake.152 That vision will continue to fuel the pursuit of equal justice work 
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and, hopefully, inspire others as well. As the goal of equal justice is 
visualized and opportunities for asserting the right to counsel in civil 
proceedings arise, the King decision will be read and reread and its impacts 
on justice evaluated. Thus, the legacy of King, if for no other reason, will be 
that inquiring minds will ask, “if not now, when?” 
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example, in Tetro, 544 P.2d at 19–20, the court held that indigent litigants charged with 
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66 The dissenters would have directly found a right to counsel in private 
custody/”residential placement” proceedings in Washington: 
The majority fails to appreciate the full extent of the liberty interest a parent 
has in the relationship with his or her child, and erroneously concludes that 
under the state constitution the right to counsel does not attach unless 
termination of the parent-child relationship is at stake and the State is a party 
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in this context under the state due process clause, article I, section 3. In accord 
with the principles enunciated in Luscier and Myricks, an indigent parent has a 
due process right to appointed counsel at public expense in residential 
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King, 174 P.3d at 681. 
67 See id. at 669. SANFORD KATZ, FAMILY LAW IN AMERICA 1 (Oxford University Press 
2003) (“It should be remembered that divorce in the United States, opposed by some 
religions, was a taboo subject, and the status of a divorced person carried with it a social 
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68 King, 174 P.3d at 661(emphasis added). 
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children with Mr. King and the negative impact on the mother’s relationship with the 
children, observing that “When a child is removed from the parent’s home, thousands of 
moments of interactions are lost.” Id. at 678 (Madsen, J., dissenting). 
71 See id. at 661. 
72 See id. at 661–62. 
73 Id. at 663. 
74 Id. at 662; see also Luscier, 524 P.2d 906; and Myrick, 533 P.2d 841 (holding that 
deprivation or impairment of parental rights in juvenile court dependency proceedings 
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75 King, 174 P.3d at 663. 
76 The majority noted that even when a parenting plan proceeding results in a child 
spending substantially less or even no time with one parent, “both parents remain parents 
and retain substantial rights, including the right to seek future modification of the 
parenting plan.” King, 174 P.3d at 663. In fact, the statute that governs the modification 
of a parenting plan, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.260 (2008), creates a very high standard 
and burden of proof for modifying a plan once in place. Hence, the “right” to seek future 
modification provides little comfort to a parent-litigant in the first instance. In this case, 
Brenda King did successfully get the parenting plan modified after she was able to get 
pro bono counsel and due to changes in the father’s circumstances. 
77 King, 174 P.3d at 662. 
78 Id. at 663. The majority’s formulation of the interest at stake erroneously collapses 
two concepts: (1) the nature of the interest, and (2) the process that is due. There is no 
question that the interest at stake for Brenda King was protection of her parent-child 
relationship, an interest that has long been deemed fundamental by both the Washington 
and U.S. Supreme Courts. The majority’s analysis failed to differentiate between the 
substantive due process rights of parents in the care, custody and control of their child 
(see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)) and the scope of potential deprivation at 
issue in a parenting plan dispute, which more logically resulted in the interest being 
afforded less protection than in the Myricks/Luscier cases. By confusing the analysis, the 
majority left the unfortunate impression that the substantive due process rights that inhere 
in the parent-child relationship are less fundamental post-King, e.g., “[T]he petitioner’s 
fundamental liberty interest is not at stake here.” King, 174 P.3d at 667. It is unclear if the 
court intended to carve out less substantive protection for parents in Washington and it 
seems inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel,  530 U.S. 57, as 
well as the Washington Supreme Court’s own recent decision in Parentage of L.B., 122 
P.3d 161. This may need to be clarified in later cases. 
79 King, 174 P.3d at 664 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.002, et. seq.) The majority 
identifies the following as “safeguards”: the statutory focus on the “best interests of the 
child” (WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.002); the court’s authority to appoint an attorney to 
represent the child’s interests (WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.110); a court’s ability to seek 
the advice of a professional (WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.210); the court’s authority to 
appoint a guardian ad litem for the children (WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.220); the 
44 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
CIVIL LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
 
provision of court facilitators for unified family courts (WASH. REV. CODE § 
26.12.802(3)(d)); and, authority to shift expenses of attorneys to the opposing party. 
(WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.140)). The majority also cites the parent’s ability to seek 
modification of a parenting plan once entered as a basis for distinguishing the impairment 
of parental rights in a dependency/termination case versus what occurs in a parenting 
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Marriage of King, (Snohomish Cty Court No. 04-3-02385-0). 
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82 See King, 174 P.3d at 674–75. 
83 Id. at 663. 
84 Id. at 664 (“Though we determine that fundamental constitutional rights are not 
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claims.”). It is impossible to read the majority decision as anything other than ambiguous 
with respect to what interests are included as “significant.” The majority goes on to 
analyze the constitutional claims (i.e., right of access to courts, state privileges and 
immunities, and federal due process and equal protection) in a logic vacuum created by 
the absence of an identified protectable fundamental right in the purely private parent-
child relationship. 
85 See id. (citing Wash. Const. art. I, § 10 (“Justice in all cases shall be administered 
openly, and without unnecessary delay.”)). Washington’s “open courts” mandate is often 
cited as the basis for the right of access to courts. 
86 Bullock v. Roberts, 524 P.2d 385, 387 (Wash. 1974) (stating that it is within the 
inherent power of the court to make such orders as are necessary to enable the poor to 
access the judicial system). 
87 While the physical facility was a barrier that the U.S. Supreme Court addressed in 
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533 (2004) (holding that meaningful access to courts is 
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88 Wash. Const. art. I, § 3 (2008); Wash. Const. art. I, § 12 (2008). 
89 See State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (Wash. 1986) (factors in analysis include “(1) 
The textual language; (2) differences in the texts; (3) constitutional history; (4) 
preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) matters of particular state or local 
concern.”).  
90 See King, 174 P.3d at 667. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. at 668. 
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2006) (No. 77981-4), (COA No. 57831-6). 
98 King, 174 P.3d at 669. 
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in light of “fundamental principles” as required by Wash. Const. art. I, § 32. Wash. 
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security of individual right and the perpetuity of free government.”) The fundamental 
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outcomes in litigation, see Engler, supra note 12. Engler reviews research data for both 
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46 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
CIVIL LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
 
help assistance by either a lawyer or a lay advocate. He concludes that the data is clear 
that favorable outcomes for represented versus unrepresented litigants are statistically 
significant. However, the data is less clear for unrepresented persons who receive some 
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